INTRODUCTION
Ever since China began to emerge as a major trading nation in late 1970s, there has been a growing concern in policy circles in East Asian countries that competition from China could crowd-out their export opportunities. Initially, the 'China fear' was mainly related to export competition in standard labour-intensive manufactured goods (clothing, footwear, sport goods), but soon it turned out to be pervasive as China begun to rapidly integrate into global production networks in electrical and electronics products through an unprecedented increase in foreign direct investment in these industries. Rapid increase in China's world export share in these product lines, coupled with some anecdotal evidence of multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in other countries in the region relocating to China, has led to concern that China is posing a serious threat to export performance not only of low-income countries but also of newly industrialised economies (NIEs), Japan and other advanced industrialised nations. This concern has gained impetus from China's recent accession to the WTO and the integration of textile and apparel products into the tariff based system following the termination of the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) with effect from January 2005. The WTO accession not only provides China with most-favoured nation (MFN) status in major markets but enhanced China's attractiveness to export-oriented investment by reducing country risk. In the lead-up to the expiry of the Multifibre Arrangement in January 2005 there was much anxiety (and confusion) in policy circles in secondtier exporting countries in the region about the future of their textile and apparel exports (Kiem 2006 , Ravenhill 2006 .
The purpose of this paper is to examine China's emerging trade patterns and their implications for export conformance of the other East Asian countries with a view to placing the * Revised version of a paper presented at the conference on Reforms for Korea's Sustained Growth organized by the East West Centre and Korea Development Institute, Honolulu, July 12-13, 2007 . I am grateful to Sanghhoon Ahn, JunTaik Hyun, Anne Kruger, Jungho Yoo and other conference participants, and to Max Corden, Satish Chand, Sisira Jayasuriya, Henryk Kierzkowsky and Rod Tyers for their valuable comments. Nobuaki Yamashita provided invaluable research assistance. policy debate on a firm factual and analytical footing. Much has been written about the implications of China's rise as a major trading nation and its implications for the rest of the world, and in particular for export performance of other Asian countries (IMF 2004 , Eichengreen et al. 2007 , Ahearne et al. 2003 , Lall and Albaladejo 2004 , Dimaranan et al. 2007 , Rodrik 2006 ).
However, this literature is based on the traditional notion of horizontal specialisation in which countries trade goods that are produced from start to finish in just one country. So far little attention has been paid to the growing complementarity of production processes across countries in the region arising from China's rapid integration into global production networks as a major assembly centre (Athukorala and Yamashita 2007 , Borrus et al. 2000 , Dean and Tam 2005 . This is a serious omission because the on-going process of production fragmentation-cross-border dispersion of component production/assembly within vertically integrated manufacturing industries-opens up opportunities for countries to specialise in different slices (different tasks) of the production process depending on their relative cost advantage and other relevant economic fundamentals (Feenstra 1998 , Grossman and RossiHansberg 2006 , Jones 2000 , Jones and Kierzkowski 2001 . This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by undertaking a detailed comparative analysis of both China's export performance in the global context and emerging market opportunities in China, while paying particular attention to possible complementarities arising from China's rapid integration into global production networks.
In order to assess the magnitude and patterns of trade arising from cross-border production networks, it is necessary to separate parts and components (henceforth referred to as 'components' for short) from final (assembled) products in reported trade data. I do this through a careful disaggregation of 5-digit level data based on the Revision 3 of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC, Rev 3) of the United Nations trade data reporting system (See Appendix 1). The data are for the period from 1992, when China and almost all countries reporting to the UN trade system had adopted the revised reporting system, to 2005, the most recent year for which data are available for all reporting countries. East Asia is defined to include Japan, and developing East Asia which covers the newly industrialised economies (NIEs) of North Asia (South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong), China and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Among the ASEAN countries, only the six largest economies -Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam-are covered; Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are ignored because of lack of data. The East Asian experience is examined in the wider global context, focusing specifically on the comparative experiences of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU). The findings suggest that the fear of export crowding-out has been vastly exaggerated in the contemporary policy debate on the implications of China's rise.
China's rapid integration into cross-border production networks of vertically integrated global industries as a major assembly centre has opened up new opportunities for the other East Asian countries to specialise in parts and components production and assembly. Moreover, China's rapid world market penetration in traditional labour intensive manufactured goods has occurred largely at the expense of the high wage East Asian NIEs.
The paper is organized in four main sections. Section 2 examines critical facts and dynamics underlying China's rapid export expansion to set the stage for a better understanding of the nature of the 'China challenge' and its likely evolution and impact. Section 3 examines the impact of China's export expansion on exports of other countries in third country markets.
Section 4 takes a similar approach to examining newly emerging market opportunities in China and comparative performance of East Asian countries in exploiting these market opportunities.
The final section summarises the key findings and offers some policy inferences.
CHINAS' TRADE PERFORMANCE: AN OVERVIEW
The rise of China as a major trading nation is one of the most momentous developments in the post-Second World War era, surpassing even the stunning rise of Germany and Japan. Total merchandise exports from China increased from US$ 8 billion (around 1% world exports) in 1978/9 when the process of liberalization reforms started to US$1442 billion (13.4%) in 2004/5. 1 In 2006 China was the second largest exporting nation in the world after Germany, and assuming the current growth rates continue, will become the largest in about ten years. Rapid export expansion has been reflected in a dramatic increase in the degree of export dependence of China to levels exceptional for a large, continental economy. China's exports to GDP ratio stood at 33% compared to an average level of around 10% for other major continental economies such as the US, Japan, India and Brazil.
1 The data reported in the paper, unless otherwise stated, come from UN Comtrade database. Throughout the paper inter-temporal comparison calculations are made for the two-year averages relating to the end points of the period under study so as to reduce the impact of year to year fluctuations of trade flows.
This phenomenal export expansion has been underpinned by a shift in the commodity composition of exports away from primary products and towards manufacturing. reports of agencies involved in promoting R&D activities but also in some scholarly writings, to argue that China is rapidly becoming an advanced technology superpower and the sophistication of its export basket is rapidly approaching the levels of those of most advanced industrial nations (Hausman et al. 2006 , LADB 2006 , Albaladejo and Lall (2004 , Rodrik 2006 .
A closer examination of data, however, suggests that such an inference is fundamentally flawed.
As already noted, China's so-called 'high-tech' exports are heavily concentrated in a single product category -information and communication products. The bulk of these products (such as note book computers, display units, mobile phones, and DVD and CD players) are simply 'mass-market commodities' produced in huge quantities and at relatively low unit cost; they are not 'leading edge-technology products ' (Bergesten et al. 2006 p. 105; Schott 2006) .
Virtually all of these products are assembled by affiliates of multinational enterprises (MNEs) ('foreign invested enterprises, FIEs') from imported components within their global production networks (Naughton, 2007; Sung, 2007 et al. 2006, p. 90) 4 Semiconductors and microprocessors best exemplify China's dependence on imported components. China has surpassed the US and Japan to become the world's largest market for semiconductors largely because they are assembled in the electronic and information technology products exported in such large volumes.
components) have continued to dominate the export composition. Over the past decade the share of final goods in total machinery exports has remained around 75%, with only minor year-to year changes. Given the fact that the production of parts and component is generally more capital-and technology-intensive than final assembly, these figures clearly suggest that China's export success has so far been underpinned largely by its comparative advantage in international production arising from labour abundance. When components are netted out, more than 80% of total Chinese manufacturing exports from China can still be treated as labour-intensive products.
In sum, the mere fact of rapid growth of final goods (end products) exports in highly fragmented high-tech industries does not necessarily imply that China is rapidly gaining maturity as a sophisticated high-tech exporting country. In a context where international fragmentation of production is becoming a symbol of economic globalization, the classification of final commodities by factor intensity is not the same as the classification of the production process occurring in these countries by factor intensity. The ongoing process of production fragmentation and China's increased integration into global production networks as an assembly centre has opened up opportunities for other countries in the region to benefit from China's rapid export expansion as participants in these networks. Bearing in mind this context, I now turn to examining the implications of China 'competition' for export performance of other East Asian countries, focussing first on export performance in third country markets and then on the new market opportunities in China. Vietnam and Cambodia would be highly vulnerable to export contraction in the new quota free markets to competition from China. It was also speculated that some competitive pressure would 5 Singapore's role in global production networks in high-tech industries shows a palpable shift in the standard assembly and testing activities to product designing and undertaking capital and technology intensive tasks in the production process, and providing head-quarter services. Some, and perhaps most, of these activities are not captured in the data on merchandise trade (Athukorala 2007) come from African countries which enjoy privileged market access to the USA under the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), and various other developing countries which had entered into preferential trading agreements with the USA and EU.
CHINA COMPETITION IN WORLD TRADE
The data on clothing imports to the USA, by far the largest single market which absorbs nearly 40% of total world exports and over a half of Indonesian exports of this product, are not consistent with this pessimistic prediction (Table 5) . 6 Naturally, high-cost clothing producing countries in the region, in particular Taiwan 6 We do not consider textile imports here because the US in not a major market for textile exports from Indonesia. In 2005, exports to the US accounted for less than 8% of total textile exports from developing Asian Countries.
Related to the second point, it should be noted that the post MFA era was never meant to be an 'era of free trade' in textile and apparel for China. The conditionality built into China's accession to the WTO had provided developed countries with the right to impose punitive tariff on imports from China in the event of 'excessively high' import growth. Mindful of this possibility, international buyers would have presumably continued to maintain the procurement networks formed during the MFA by and large intact notwithstanding the MFA phase-out. In any case, given the obvious country-risk considerations, it is unlikely that international buyers would 'put all their eggs in one (Chinese!) basket' even in an entirely free market setting.
China Competition: An econometric test
It is clear from the discussion in the previous section that the widely held view that China's rapid world market penetration is at the expense of export opportunities of the other countries in East Asia (and other developing countries) is not consistent with the actual trade data. A negative impact was visible only in traditional labour intensive products, but this impact seems to be country specific depending on the degree of comparative advantage in labour intensive production. In machinery exports the impact appears to be more complementary than competing, presumably reflecting supply-side complementarities within regional production networks. I now turn to a more formal examination of the implications of these patterns for the export performance of Japan and other East Asian countries in the broader context of China's integration into global production networks.
The analytical tool used for this purpose is the gravity equation, which has established itself as the dominant empirical framework for analysing bilateral trade flows. 7 This application of the gravity equation builds on that of Eichengreen et al. (2007) who examine the impact of China on export performance of 13 Asian countries using the conventional commodity classification of consumer, intermediate and investment goods, with components (together with the related final products) subsumed under the third category. The major novelty of the present analysis lies in the specific emphasis placed on delineating the implications for export performance of other countries of China's rapid integration into regional production networks. This is done by carefully decomposing machinery and transport equipments exports into components and final goods and then estimating separate export equations for these categories.
My approach also differs from that of Eichengreen et al. (2007) in that the relationship between China's export market penetration and export performance of Asian countries is examined in a broader global context, rather that focussing specifically on selected Asian countries. This is done in order to examine whether the degree and nature of China's impact on East Asian countries is different from the overall impact at the global level (the average global picture).
The analysis is carried out in two steps. First, the basic gravity is augmented by incorporating a number of explanatory variables suggested by recent theoretical and empirical advances in the emerging literature on international production fragmentation and then add China's export to the same third country markets (CHXP) as an additional explanatory variable.
This is the benchmark specification of our analysis. The coefficient on CHXP in the estimated model provides a measure of the effect of China's exports over and above that of the other relevant influences captured in the model variables on export performance of the countries covered by our analysis. The second stage of the analysis involves re-estimating the model by interacting CHXP with dummy variables specified for countries/country groups of interest to examine whether China's emergence as a major player has the same or differential effects on their export performance.
The benchmark model is, 
where subscripts i and j refer to the reporting (exporting) and the partner (importing) country and the variables are listed and defined below, with the postulated sign of the regression coefficient for the explanatory variables in brackets. we also included binary dummy variables to represent common language, common colonial relationship, landlockness , and island status of countries. These were subsequently omitted because statistical insignificance and erratic sign changes among alternative specifications. We also tested two variables, telephone mainlines per 1,000 people (TELE) and per capital electricity production in kilo-watts (kwh) (ELET), to represent infra-structure related trade cost, and an institutional quality variable (the index of institutional quality recently constructed by Kaufmann et al 2006) to capture transaction costs associated contract enforcement. These variables were found to be highly correlated with PGDP. A binary dummy variable included to capture the possible trade effects of membership in regional trading agreements also fount to be statistically insignificant throughout. Exclusion of these variables (jointly and individually) was supported by the standard variable deletion (F) test.
exports from China). The first two instruments are suggested by the standard gravity model as applied to Chinese exports and they are thus potentially correlated with CHXI, but not with the dependent variable (Frankel and Romer 1999) . The choice of the third variable is based on the recent literature on the role of MNEs in export performance in China. I believe that it is a suitable instrumental variable because it is difficult to think that MNE presence in China could have significant direct effect on export performance of other countries except through its impact on China's trade to third country markets. 9 All four variable also easily pass the exclusion restriction of instrumental variable choice; that is, they do not belong in the equation explain bilateral export flows between other countries.
The regression results are reported in Table 6 . First consider the bench mark regressions (Table 6A) Are there notable differences in the way China competition is felt by East Asian countries as a group compared to the other country groups covered in the study? Does the impact vary among countries in East Asia? According to the second set of regression results (Table 6B) is, however, much larger compared to the other three country groups. This mostly reflects the fact that exports from these countries have been increasing from a rather low base. Also, given the relatively high manufacturing wages in Latin American countries, presumably there is no 11 The coefficients do not overlap within the three standard error band.
significant overlap between tasks performed in these countries within global production networks and those undertaken in China and other second-tier exporting countries in East Asia (IADB 2006) . At the disaggregated level, East Asia's relatively superiority in withstanding China competition (compared to OECD and CEEU) seems to lie predominantly in component trade.
The severity of import competition faced by the East Asian countries as a group in both miscellaneous manufacturing and final machinery products is clearly shown by the results.
The results for individual East Asian countries in Table 6C clearly illustrate the large differences among countries in terms of the degree of export growth associated with a given percentage point increase in China's exports. For miscellaneous manufacturing, the sharp contraction in market shares of East Asian NIEs and upper-middle income countries in the face of China's rapid export expansion is clearly seen. In Machinery exports, growth rates of ASEAN countries are higher compared to Japan and Korea. This superior export performance is clearly visible for both components and final goods. With the exception of Japan, Korea and Singapore in miscellaneous goods markets, in none of the product categories is the 'total' coefficient (that is, the coefficient of CHEP plus that of the slope interaction dummy) negative for East Asia or the other two country groups. Put simply, while the severity of China competition clearly varies cross commodity categories and among country groups, there is evidence of complementarity in export performance rather than of export crowding-out.
CHINA AS A NEW EXPORT MARKET
The share of imports from East Asia in total non-oil imports of China has remained around 56% over the past two decades with only minor year to year fluctuation (Table 7 
China's Import Propensity: An Econometric Test
This section aims to quantify the impact of China's economic expansion on export performance of other countries operating though its own import demand by fitting a modified version of the gravity equation used in the previous section. Alternative formulations of the gravity model estimated for this purpose are reported in Table 9 . Note that the key issues of interest here are (a) the degree to which import flows are related to China's economic expansion measured by GDP, and (b) how the magnitude of the measured relationship varies among commodity categories and trading partners once we control for the other relevant variables. In the preliminary regression runs China's GDP and per capita GDP variables were found to be highly correlated. So the final estimates reported here contain only the GDP variable and the related country/country group slope interaction dummies. The coefficient of GDP in each equation shows the average degree of import elasticity of China's economic expansion. The estimated coefficient of a given interaction variable indicates the degree to which the degree of elasticity of imports from the particular country group/country deviates from that average level.
The results suggest that China's economic expansion has been accompanied by an increase in total non-oil merchandise imports at a rate of over one-and-a-half times that of average GDP growth (9%) in the country during the period under study (Table 9B) . Among the broader commodity categories considered here, the sharpest rate of expansion was in machinery components. Imports of this commodity category grew at a rate of more than twice of the GDP growth rate. The results for the GDP interaction dummy for the three country groups suggest that the rate of growth of imports from East Asia associated with one percentage point increase in GDP in China was about 0.70 percentage points higher compared to imports from OECD countries, after controlling for other relevant determinants. The results show a much greater propensity for importing from Latin American countries, but as already noted this probably reflects the rather low initial base of imports from these countries. The results for machinery imports, disaggregated into components and final goods, confirm our earlier inference about China's heavy reliance on parts and component imports from the region for domestic output expansion. The results for the slope dummy variables reported in Table 10B point to the emerging patterns of increasing reliance on parts and component imports from ASEAN countries. Overall, across all product categories, the degree of propensity to import from Korea is greater compared to imports from Japan.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The evidence harnessed in this paper supports the view that, in a context where international fragmentation of production is becoming the symbol of economic globalization, the standard trade flow analysis leads to misleading inferences about the sophistication of China's emerging export patterns. Although China has displayed a rapid increase in exports of high-tech products in recent years, the actual value added in China is generally not in high-tech activities. When components are netted out, the bulk of Chinese manufacturing exports from China can still be treated as labour-intensive products.
The emergence of China as a major exporter has obviously begun to have considerable impact on the trading environment faced by other countries in the region. However, the gloomy predictions of the implications of increased Chinese competition may be misleading. There is clear evidence that competition from China does not necessarily imply proportionate losses in market share for all developing countries. China's rapid integration into cross-border production networks of vertically integrated global industries as a major assembly centre, has created new opportunities for the other East Asian countries to specialise in parts and components production and assembly. This development is an important counterpoint to the popular belief that China's global integration would crowd out other countries' opportunities for international specialization.
Moreover, China's rapid world market penetration in labour intensive manufactured goods has occurred largely at the expense of the high-wage East Asian NIEs, which have naturally been rapidly loosing comparative advantage in these product lines as part of the export-led industrial transformation.
The increasing intra-regional economic interdependence in East Asia through international product fragmentation does not, however, mean that the process has contributed to lessening the regions dependence on the global economy. The region's growth dynamism based on this new form of specialisation continues to depend on its extra-regional trade in final goods, and this dependence has in fact increased over the years. Put simply, growing trade in components has made the East Asia region increasingly reliant on extra-regional trade for its growth dynamism. Based on this finding, one can make a strong case for re-examining the economic implications of the so-called 'ASEAN + 10' which aims to bringing together the ten nations of Southeast Asia with Japan, Korea, and China into a broader 'East Asian Community'.
This new form of international specialisation cannot be sustained purely as an East Asian phenomenon because of the growing importance of extra-regional markets for final products.
Moreover, regional trade liberalization initiatives are unlikely to make much (if any) difference to cross-border trade in components because this trade takes place entirely under zero-duty concessions. In this context, these countries would be better off upholding universal principles of economic openness.
Is China's reliance on other countries in the region for sourcing components for its burgeoning electronics and electrical industries a structural feature of the ongoing process of its rapid economic integration or simply a passing phenomenon which would last only until China develops its own domestic production capabilities? Some analysts have alluded to the latter possibility, arguing that China has the potential to build a strong electronics industry based predominantly on locally produced components within its boundaries (eg. Lall and Albaladejo 2004, Kiem 2006 , Yusuf et al 2006 , Freeman 2005 . This is of course an interesting issue for further study, but there is ample evidence that that firms involved in vertically integrated global industries tend to rely increasingly on international networks of production, which embrace different territories and different forms of cooperation to optimise their competitiveness. Because of technological complexities and intrinsic country-specific cost advantages, countries are becoming specialised in specific activities in the value chain and in certain kinds of products.
Moreover, over a long period of time many MNEs (particularly US-based MNEs) have significantly upgraded the technical capabilities of their regional production networks in other East Asian countries and have assigned global production responsibilities to affiliates located in more mature countries in the region Naturally country risk considerations would have a much greater bearing on any corporate decision to deviate from these well established global practices compared to simple relative cost considerations. Furthermore, China is still at a very early stage of developing private property rights, respects for intellectual property and venture capital financing practices which are important long-run contributors to converting scientific and technological innovations into successful commercial ventures (Huang 2003 , Gilboy 2004 ).
Given the current state of China's factor market conditions (as surveyed in a number of recent studies, including Blanchard and Giavazzi 2006 , Hu 2006 , Cooper 2006 , Meng and Bai 2007 , Naughton 2007 , one can speculate that China's trade patterns are unlikely to change dramatically in the short to medium run. China still has about half of its labour force in agriculture where its productivity is, on average, barely one-eighth of that in industry and about a quarter of that in the service sector. Agriculture still accounts for over 45% of total employment in the country even though agriculture's share in GDP is only 13%. GDP per worker in the economy as a whole is three times the value added per worker in agriculture. The country still remains very rural, with a rate of urbanization of about 40% of the total population, much lower than a 'normal' level of 60% consistent with Chin's income level. These features, coupled with the high skilled-unskilled wage differential (which, according to some estimates, has risen from 1.3 to 2.1 over the past decade according to some estimates) suggest that China still has much potential for moving unskilled workers out of agriculture and into manufacturing and other productive urban sector activities. For this to materialise, the global trading environment would need to remain accommodative and Chinese policies receptive to gains from specialisation on the basis of comparative advantage.
APPENDIX 1:
Trade Data
The Data reported under SITC 7 provide a comprehensive coverage of fragmentation-based trade, but data for SITC 8 do not seem to fully capture fragmentation-based trade within that commodity category. For instance, for some products -such as clothing, furniture and leather products -in which outsourcing is prevalent (and perhaps has been increasing), some related components (for example, pieces of textiles, parts of furniture, parts of leather soles) are presumably recorded under other SITC categories. Moreover, there is evidence that production fragmentation has been spreading beyond SITC 7 and 8 to other product categories such as pharmaceutical and chemical products (falling under SITC 5) and machine tools and various metal products (SITC 6).
Assembly activities in software trade, too, have recorded impressive expansion in recent years.
These are lumped together with 'special transactions' under SITC 9. As a result, my tabulations of the magnitude of fragmentation-based trade are downward biased. However, the magnitude of the bias is unlikely to be substantial because fragmentation-based international specialisation is predominantly concentrated in the machinery and transport equipment category (SITC 7) (Yeats 2001 , Feenstra 1998 .
The data are tabulated using importer records, which are considered to be more appropriate for analysing trade patterns than are the corresponding exporter records. Data from importer records are presumably less susceptible to double counting and erroneous identification of the source/destination country in the presence of entrepot trade than are data based on reporting country records (for example, China's trade through Hong Kong and Indonesia's trade through Singapore) (Ng and Yeats (2003: Appendix 1) and Feenstra et al. (1999) . Also, some countries fail to properly report goods shipped from their own export-processing zones; they simply lump these exports into one highly aggregated category of 'special transactions' under SITC 9. There is no fully satisfactory solution for these problems, but it is generally believed that data compiled from importer records are less susceptible to recording errors and reveal the origins and composition of trade more accurately than other records, because there are normally important legal penalties for incorrectly specifying this information on customs declarations.
Among the East Asian countries, Taiwan is not covered in the UN data system; Vietnam has not yet begun to make data available using the standard UN format; and Singapore did not report data on its bilateral trade with Indonesia, for political reasons. In these cases, I filled the data gaps (2000) price. Exports (at CIF price, US$): compiled from importer records of UN-COMTRADE, online database (http://www.bls.gov/ppi/home.htm ). Exports value series was deflated by the machinery and transport equipment sub-index of the US producer price index.
GDP,GDPP
Real GDP, and real per capita GDP (at 1995 price) World Development Indicator, The World Bank 
INSTQ
Institutional quality. An index which measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abided by the rule of society, based on perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the credibility of contracts. The index ranks from 0 to 2.5, with a higher number indicating better rules of law enforcement.
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) .
RULC
The ratio of unit labour cost in country j and country i. Unit labour cost is measured as the ratio of the average manufacturing wage to manufacturing value added per worker. By construct, an increase (a decrease) in RULC indicates an improvement (a deterioration) in i's cost competitiveness relative to j. 
where, NER is the nominal bilateral exchange rate index., P W in price level of country j measured by the producer price index and P D is the domestic price index of country I measured by the GDP deflator. By construct, an increase (decrease) in RER ij indicates a an improvement (deterioration) in i's competitiveness in traded-goods production vis a vis j Constructed using data obtained from World bank, World development Indicators database. Following Soloaga and Winters (2001) , mean-adjusted RER is used in the model. This variable specification assumes that countries are in exchange rate equilibrium at the mean.
EAS, LATM, CEEU, OECD
Dummy variables to identify whether the given country belongs to East Asia (EAS), Latin America (LATM), Central and Eastern Europe (CEEU), or the Organization of Economic Corporation and Development (OECD).
In constructing these variables Japan and Korea are classified under EAS, and Mexico under LATM, Note: 1 The standard errors (SEs) of the regression coefficients have been derived using the Huber-While consistent variance-covariance 'sandwich') estimator.
